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majorityss that Fried leveled at the court of appeals. Indeed, each
dissent employs strong language in characterizing the course of the
abortion decisions.s6
If the law is increasingly shaped in the appellate courts-especially the Supreme Court-and if an attorney general wishes to pursue an activist agenda seeking changes in the law, the appellate
business of the Department of Justice will inevitably play the key
role in advancing the agenda. Thus it was under President
Roosevelt and thus it was under President Reagan. No one should
be surprised that this substantive agenda has been pursued at a cost:
the loss of some able advocates from government service, the deterioration of procedural regularity within the Department, and the
loss of some of the luster of the Office of the Solicitor General.
It should be stressed, however, that these costs seem to have
brought the Reagan administration few of the gains it sought. Arguably a less tendentious approach to its agenda might have been
more successful, while costing less. One hopes that the costs are
only temporary; much depends on the new solicitor general and attorney general.

THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950. By Mark V. Tushnet.1
Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press.
1987. Pp. xiv, 166. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $9.95.
John Cary Sims 2
Are you ready to read more about the School Desegregation
Cases? You probably thought that you had this topic well in hand
after reading Richard Kluger's Simple Justice, the chapter in Bernard Schwartz's Superchief dealing with Brown v. Board of Education, and Dennis Hutchinson's ambitious article.3 Maybe you've
even kept up with the recent firelight between Philip Elman and
55. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814.
56. E.g., Chief Justice Burger ("undermines" limitations of Roe "astonishingly"; renders them "shallow rhetoric"), id. at 782-84; Justice White ("nonsensical," "mysterious"
findings, "linguistic nit-picking," "bafiling," "inexplicable," "warped," and "tortuous"), id.
at 802-14; and Justice O'Connor ("major distortion," "mischaracterizes," "dangerous extravagance"), id. at 814-29.
I. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
2. Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.
3. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court,
1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. I (1979).
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Randall Kennedy about the role played by the Department of Justice in the cases,4 and a law clerk's recollections about the deliberations which eventually led Justice Reed to join the rest of the Court
in repudiating the "separate but equal" doctrine.s It would be reasonable to wonder whether many readers need or want to know
more about the School Desegregation Cases than can be learned by
reading these and other works.
Professor Mark Tushnet's book nonetheless provides a valuable supplement to the literature about Brown. His principal focus is
on events that prepared the ground for Brown rather than on that
case itself. Prior to the direct attack on school segregation, the
NAACP had devoted its resources to three more limited classes of
desegregation suits: those seeking to desegregate the graduate and
professional schools at public universities; those attempting to
equalize the salaries of black and white teachers; and those challenging inequality of physical facilities at black and white elementary and secondary schools. Professor Tushnet describes in great
detail the planning and execution of this earlier litigation, so that
readers will appreciate the significance of the NAACP's decision in
1950 to change direction and tackle head-on the legality of all segregation in public education.
To a greater degree than previous studies of Brown, this book
"was written from the perspective of the national office of the
NAACP," primarily on the basis of NAACP papers which have
been transferred to the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.6 Not only are the source materials (other than published
court decisions) mostly drawn from the NAACP's files, but
Tushnet consistently views the desegregation campaign from the institutional perspective of the NAACP. Thus, there is a detailed examination of how the money was raised to support the litigation,
how the legal staff was selected, how the cases to be litigated were
identified, how the NAACP's central staff and the local attorneys
assisting them developed and presented their legal theories, and
how disagreements among the staff and between the staff and other
segments of the black community on strategy were resolved. Every
4. Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1987); Kennedy, A Reply to Philip
Elman, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1987); Elman, Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (1987).
5. Fassett, Mr. Justice Reed and Brown v. The Board of Education, 1986 SUPREME
CoURT HISTORICAL SociETY Y.B. 48.
6. In 1939, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. was established as a
corporate entity distinct from the NAACP. However, untill957 the "Inc. Fund" served as a
subsidiary of the NAACP, and therefore there is no need to distinguish between the two
organizations in this review. See NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc.,
753 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021-22 (1985).
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lawsuit has this sort of underbrush, but it is rare for such matters to
be exposed to public view. Tushnet speculates that this is because
"information is available about the practice of public interest law
that is in general not available about the practice of law on behalf of
corporations and individuals." As a rule, attorneys representing
private parties, even in litigation of great moment, do not make similar documents public-don't plan on going down to the Library of
Congress any time soon to look over Cravath, Swaine & Moore's
files on United States v. IBM. It is rare for even a public interest
litigation campaign to be so amply documented and open to public
view, and therefore Tushnet's careful sifting of the records is especially valuable to anyone interested in how an important and interesting group of interrelated cases was handled by dedicated and able
attorneys.
Tushnet's book is unusual in another respect: it treats litigation as a social process that "begins well before a lawsuit is filed and
ends well after a judgment is entered." Tushnet describes public
interest litigation as a process which begins when a group of people
"discover that they agree that something is wrong," and continues
through their efforts to find counsel and prosecute their claims, up
to a resolution of the claims by the courts, and beyond. Even after
judgment, the process often continues, as "the locus of controversy
shifts from the courts to the legislatures, as prevailing plaintiffs seek
more effective relief, or as losing plaintiffs seek to get some relief
from someone."
From his exhaustive study of the NAACP's litigation campaign, Tushnet attempts to draw conclusions about public interest
litigation in general. This effort focuses on several issues. Tushnet
states that prior chroniclers of the Brown litigation, most notably
Richard Kluger, have succumbed to the temptation to "see the outcome as the obvious product of plans that had been laid many years
before." While recognizing the "manifest virtues" of Simple Justice, Tushnet believes that it "is flawed by the dramatic unity that
its style gives to the story. The novelist's talents suggest that each
small item in the story contributed in an important way to the
larger outcome, and the journalist's talents simplify a complex reality to make it easier to understand." Tushnet attributes a larger
role to "chance-unexpected events or decisions by individuals
outside of the movement-and choice-decisions by insiders to pursue one path rather than another that in retrospect seems almost
equally sensible." Tushnet notes, moreover, that the choices made
by the individuals controlling a given piece of litigation are affected
by their own preferences and personalities. He concludes that,
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within the wide boundaries set by the NAACP's determination to
attack white supremacy, the organization's efforts were not systematic or strategic. Instead, it "attacked what might be called targets
of opportunity."
The "targets of opportunity" approach is more sensible than it
may sound. It would be foolish to adopt a long-term litigation
strategy that required an organization to eschew a promising case
simply because it had not been anticipated. Reformist lawyers need
to keep their minds open, while recognizing that some spur-of-themoment cases should be declined. The NAACP's litigation campaign provides examples of both self-restraint and aggressive litigation of the "damn the torpedoes" variety. For example, the
organization did not pursue a possible suit in North Carolina on
behalf of an applicant to medical school who had scored very poorly
on the aptitude examination. On the other hand, it did represent
Lloyd Gaines in his efforts to attend the University of Missouri Law
School, even though the staff feared that he was not a suitable plaintiff. Those fears turned out to be justified, since the victory Gaines
won in the Supreme Court could not be implemented because the
plaintiff had dropped from sight and could not be located by his
attorneys.
Tushnet mulls over two other issues pertinent to all public interest litigation, on which the NAACP's desegregation campaign
might shed light. One is the degree to which the NAACP lawyers
were free of control by their clients in designing and implementing
the direct attack on segregated education. He concludes that the
attorneys "could not have imposed, and did not need to impose,
decisions on their clients." Tushnet argues that the NAACP could
not win its lawsuits without strong support from the black community for which it claimed to speak, and that the actual clients which
the organization represented in particular cases were strong-willed
individuals motivated primarily by idealism rather than individual
self-interest-the sort of person who is least likely to defer to an
attorney.
Tushnet also tries to determine whether the shape of the
NAACP's litigation campaign was more a product of what was going on inside the NAACP or of the broader social developments
occurring in the United States between the early 1930s and 1950.
He concludes that the "role of organizational factors seems significantly more important than that of variations in the general social
environment." "[B]y the time the campaign became a major effort,
it had developed its own dynamic. . . . [E]conomic and political
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developments had no more than a rough connection to what occurred during the litigation campaign."
In my view, the narrative elements of the book are an unqualified success. Tushnet is careful and straightforward, and his story
sustains its momentum despite the fact that the nature of the material inevitably leads to some dense passages. Gaines, Sipue/, Sweatt,
and McLaurin, along with a number of less prominent cases, are
fleshed out in a way that contributes a great deal to our understanding of the desegregation campaign.
Tushnet's effort to draw general principles out of the
NAACP's experience is ambitious and well-handled, but may in the
end confirm the suspicion that every major case (and every litigation campaign) is so nearly unique that any effort to generalize
(even a careful and imaginative one like Tushnet's) is doomed to fall
short. To his credit, Tushnet himself emphasizes the temptations to
which an historian is prone. A jumbled, chaotic, and somewhat arbitrary series of events, through the lens of hindsight, may seem to
reveal a clear and steady line of development heading toward a conclusion which is seen as virtually inevitable. By identifying the false
starts, errors, and other setbacks which at times deflected or
delayed the school desegregation campaign, Tushnet injects a
healthy dose of reality into a story which can easily be streamlined
and distorted by our knowledge of how Brown was decided.
Tushnet is also right to stress the large role played in litigation
by chance, by personalities, by the characteristics of the organizations involved, and even by geography. For example, he tells us
repeatedly that much of the NAACP's early school litigation was
conducted in Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia (rather than
in the Deep South) primarily because those areas were often more
accessible to the NAACP's attorneys. Maryland was, in addition,
the "home ground" of Thurgood Marshall, who played the lead
role in the desegregation campaign, and for that reason, among
others, it became one of the NAACP's preferred venues for litigation. No litigator would question the importance of such seemingly
mundane considerations, and I suspect that close examination of
other litigation would confirm that accidents of geography have
often affected choices of where to litigate. I know, for example, that
the Commonwealth of Virginia has, over the past fifteen years, been
drawn into more than its fair share of test-case litigation because it
is such a short drive from the Washington, D.C. office of the Public
Citizen Litigation Group to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.
The role of chance in litigation, while significant, is usually dif-
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ficult to disentangle from other determinants of success. Opportunities for false inferences abound. For example, like many
attorneys, I generally prefer to prosecute federal constitutional
claims in the federal courts, in the belief that on balance state courts
will be less receptive to such claims. 1 Yet, on occasion, I have taken
over constitutional litigation which has already been initiated in
state courts and carried it forward, since it could not be refiled in
federal court without suffering substantial delay or some other detriment. While I was pleased when the state courts ruled for my
clients in those cases, my confidence in my ability to select the most
favorable forum was badly shaken: my clients could have done no
better-and might have done worse-in the federal courts. If I had
been able to litigate in federal court and we had ultimately won, I'm
sure that to this day I would believe that my seemingly astute forum-shopping was one of the reasons for our success. A historian
reviewing the litigation would probably agree, especially after talking to mel
The biggest question in any history of litigation is likely to be,
"Why did the case tum out as it did?" While this inquiry can be
interesting on its own terms, one hopes that the historian will provide an answer with implications for other litigation strategists. It
is in pressing for a satisfactory explanation of the NAACP's success
that Tushnet takes on his most difficult task, and it is on that score
that the book is most disappointing, at least to those of us with a
strong practical interest in public interest litigation. His short answer to the question of "Why victory?" is: "Thurgood Marshall."
Having recounted the process by which the NAACP moved from
its program of "equalization" suits to an all-out attack on segregation, Tushnet observes:
Marshall had preferred the direct attack from the start, and between 1945 and 1950
there were essentially no legal developments making it more sensible to begin the
attack in 1950 than it would have been in 1945. But Marshall deferred the decision
from a time when it would have seriously split the NAACP to a time when the
external environment, in politics and legal doctrine, and the internal politics of the
organization made it easier for others to agree that what Marshall wanted was in
their interest too. Marshall's strength had always resided in his superb judgments
about life and law, rather than in his ability to construct a legal argument. The way
in which the direct attack decision was made shows him at his best. 8

My disappointment with the interpretive component of Profes7. See generally Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977).
8. Along the same line, Tushnet states that "the extraordinary character of Thurgood
Marshall played a crucial part" in achieving favorable settlements in the suits in which black
teachers sought salaries equal to their white counterparts, since "Marshall was a charismatic
figure in the black community" and thus able to convince the black teachers to hold firm in
the negotiations.
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sor Tushnet's book should not be taken as necessarily reflecting any
disagreement with his conclusion. Thurgood Marshall unquestionably made an enormous contribution to the successful outcome of
the litigation campaign, in conjunction with the other able and dedicated attorneys for the NAACP. From my perhaps narrow perspective as a litigator, however, attributing victory to the lawyer is
too much like attributing it to luck: it's interesting to know why
things turned out the way they did, but the answer, even if correct,
is of little or no assistance to lawyers planning the next litigation
campaign.
Be that as it may, Tushnet has written a fine book: solid, fascinating, and instructive.9 For those who contemplate similar
projects, I have one final suggestion: We need studies of unsuccessful constitutional campaigns. There is a natural tendency to write
about victories rather than defeats. Yet our understanding of success can never exceed our understanding of failure. Wouldn't it be
fascinating to read a book, as thorough and intelligent as Tushnet's,
about Bowers v. Hardwick, the daring but unsuccessful challenge to
state laws making homosexual sodomy a crime? "Comparative litigation" might be as instructive as comparative law.
9. Judge Robert L. Carter of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York has recently leveled a number of harsh criticisms at Professor Tushnet's book.
Carter, Book Review, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1083 (1988). Judge Carter's reactions are especially
important because he participated in the events described in the book as a staff attorney for
the NAACP. In my view, the tension between the theories set out in the Tushnet book and
those advanced by Judge Carter is not nearly as great as the Judge's review would make it
appear. For example, Judge Carter states that "contrary" to Professor Tushnet's view, "the
national office [of the NAACP] took a stand against any form of segregation [in 1950] and led
its local constituency to accept that view." Jd. at 1089-90. I do not believe that Professor
Tushnet disagrees. ("It is true that the choice between equalization and direct attack was
postponed from 1945, when the issue surfaced, to 1950.... The delays were used to prepare
the organization for the direct attack decision that Marshall preferred all along.") Judge
Carter also states that "Professor Tushnet seems to believe that if the NAACP had lowered
its sights and pressed for equal facilities, whites might have been more sympathetic and success more likely." Jd. at 1091. I read Tushnet as supporting the appropriateness of the direct
attack strategy. I believe that Judge Carter and Professor Tushnet are in agreement that,
while the education received by blacks today may be no better than the education they would
be receiving under a system of separate-but-really-equal schools, the separate-is-not-equal
principle of Brown provided the impetus for much broader efforts to achieve equal treatment
for blacks, such as through civil rights legislation, in addition to removing a major source of
humiliation and stigma.

